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Abstract 
Purpose- This paper discusses the National DNA Database (NDNAD) and some of the 
controversies surrounding it with reference to legal and ethical issues, focusing particularly on 
privacy and human rights. Governance of this database involves specific exemptions from the 
Data Protection Act (DPA), and this gives a rise to concerns regarding both the extent of 
surveillance on the UK population, and the possibility for harm to all citizens. This is of wider 
importance since every current citizen, and everybody who visits the UK, could become a record 
in the DNA database. Principally, we explore whether these exemptions would also imply 
exemptions for software developers from codes of practice and ethics of their professional 
societies as relate to constructing or maintaining such data and the database.  
Design/methodology/approach- We make a comparison between the principles of the DPA, as 
would need to be followed by all other organizations handling personal data, professional 
responsibilities based codes of ethics of professional societies, and the current reality as reported 
in relation to the NDNAD and the exemptions offered through the DPA. 
Findings- Primarily, if NDNAD were not exempted from certain provisions in the DPA, the 
potential for the kinds of data leakages and other mishandlings could largely be avoided without 
the need for further considerations over so-called “data minimization”.  We see how the lack of 
afforded protection allows for a wide range of issues as relate at least to privacy. 
Originality/value- This paper provides the first evaluation of the combination of law, codes of 
ethics and activities in the real world as related to NDNAD, with concomitant considerations for 
privacy, liberty and human rights. Originality is demonstrated through consideration of the 
implications of certain exemptions in the DPA in relation to crime and taxation and national 
security, and in relating the expected protections for personal data to widely reported evidence 
that such protections may be variously lacking. In addition, we provide a broad overview of 
controversies over certain newer kinds of DNA analysis, and other relatively recent findings, that 
seem generally absent from the vast majority of debates over this kind of analysis. 
Keywords- DNA, Data Protection, Computing, Professionalism, Code of Ethics 
Paper type- Research paper 
1. Introduction 
Software systems collect a range of data about individuals in various walks of life. Use of such 
systems can be wide-ranging, from CCTV-based monitoring of particular scenes and situations, 
to capturing data about particular purchases and using these data to offer further products and 
services, to determining whether sufficient numbers of computer keys have been pressed per 
hour. These software systems exist in the workplace, home, public areas, and transportation 
(Chen & Park, 2005; Vuokko, 2008). The continual introduction of such software systems often 
gives rise to privacy issues, with some concerns raised over a “Surveillance Society” (House of 
Commons, 2008). Of course, it is possible to conceive of somebody who knows everything about 
an individual, but has purely voyeuristic intentions: “you have complete autonomy, just no 
privacy” (Moor 1997), and argue a case for such voyeurism as protection from harm: “if every 
inch of the globe was viewed, recorded and indexed, virtually no deviance from social norms 
(such as criminal activity) would go undetected” (Lockton & Rosenberg 2005). The extent to 
which individuals become concerned by such developments will depend to some extent on their 
perception of the need for such surveillance to ensure collective good versus individual privacy 
(Palm, 2008). This perception of need of surveillance may be fuelled, further, by the digital-era 
media-driven characterization of “Person as risk” (Hoven & Manders-Huits, 2008), in which we 
consider every individual to have potential criminal intent towards us.  Such a characterization 
may lead, subsequently, to having to prove innocence rather than have guilt proven - the 
comprehensive use of such technologies could lead to increasing numbers of false positives 
unless accuracy is guaranteed. With increased proliferation of data mining and data sharing, 
allowing different data to be analyzed to infer new information, and used by others without data 
subject consent, privacy issues may get accrue (Lockton & Rosenberg, 2005). Over-generation 
of matches against Terrorist Watchlists suggests significant potential for, at minimum, 
inconvenience and disruption, particularly when “about half of the tens of thousands of potential 
matches sent to the [U.S. Terrorist Screening] center between December 2003 and January 2006 
for further research turned out to be misidentifications.” (USGAO, 2006), and data mining as 
deployed in recommender systems produces inferences indicative of assumptions that “Tivo 
thinks I am gay and Amazon thinks I am pregnant” (Contractor, 2007). 
This notion of “person as risk”, then, not only suggests surveillance (Ward, 2004) but also 
suggests that such surveillance may be beneficial to us since we can also be ruled out of 
investigations using the same technologies. One example of where such thinking is evident is the 
United Kingdom’s National DNA Database (NDNAD). DNA samples and associated data can 
provide a deal of personal information which even its “owner” might not be aware of.  Generally, 
based on European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (OUT-LAW, 2007), the UK’s Data 
Protection Act 1998, should provide safeguards on citizen's data and assure citizens of no 
infringements on their privacy and human rights (Howley et.al., 2005). Until now, NDNAD has 
been variously exempt from some of these provisions. 
Computer professionals are expected to follow laws of their country of operation. In the online 
environment, it becomes less clear which laws apply to certain activities unless the relevant 
jurisdiction is identified in, usually extensive, terms of use, privacy policies (OUT-LAW, 
2008b), or other such documents. Moreover, the latest technologies may provide a challenge in 
interpretation of existing laws, which may only be clarified by test cases. Even then, appeals may 
alter the interpretation. The computer professional must keep abreast of such interpretations 
since they may impact on extant business.  Conflicts in laws in the international environment, 
difficulties in interpretation, and potentially even exemptions from law, provide a difficult 
operating environment.  Nevertheless, computer professionals are expected to follow codes of 
ethics or practice to design systems that will, for example, ensure privacy and human rights are 
honoured.  McGraw (2004) describes a “professional code of Ethics” as the product of a 
professionally-defined social group’s efforts to enforce certain rules of behavior among its 
members, and there are several that might be referred to here: from the British Computer Society 
(BCS, 2006), the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM, 1993), and the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (ACM/IEEE-CS,1999 ). It is arguable whether they all share 
the same principles (Gotterbarn, 1997) or how well considered they might be (Gotterbarn, 2007). 
Occasionally, the codes provide guidance where laws may be deficient in specific instances or 
countries, though this may be an artifact of reference to national laws in the country of origin of 
these codes.  While there may be an exemption from national law or a part thereof, for a specific 
application, these codes may not be so clear about whether such exemptions carry over to the 
codes themselves, and what the priority should be. In addition, such codes apply to the work of 
the professionally-defined social group, but perhaps consideration of application to the results 
produced by the systems and software are also vital? It may be difficult to evaluate the potential 
for negative use of certain software applications, while others may be more obviously apt for 
negative uses. 
This paper discusses surveillance using data – dataveillance - with a focus on the UK’s National 
DNA Database (NDNAD) and some of the controversies surrounding it, and reference to legal 
and ethical issues. Broader questions exist over privacy and human rights (Johnston, Waterfield, 
2007) and viewpoints can be drawn from the application of ethical theories and considerations of 
negative and positive rights in trading for civil liberties for personal and national security. 
Consideration of such issues is important to understand the possibility for harm to all citizens, 
every one of whom, merely by visiting the UK, could become a record in the DNA database. 
Also, there are calls from certain quarters for a national database of everyone's DNA to avoid 
discrimination 1 and even a global database 2 - but as yet there are no plans to DNA profile 
everyone in the UK, though no-one ever says never3. According to the European Data Protection 
Supervisor, there is no specific framework proposed for an EU shared database (OUT-LAW, 
2007). Those in the UK might have thought they could rely on protection via DPA and related 
international agreements, though with certain exemptions to the DPA, protection seems to be 
somewhat limited. The outcome of a recent case in the European Court of Human Rights, S. and 
Marper v. The United Kingdom, 2008, in which it was deemed that the retention of the DNA of 
these subjects represented a breach of their human rights, may force change on how retention of 
DNA is retained, both for current and future records (ECHR, 2008).    
2. Background 
In terms of dataveillance, the UK boasts significant, and expanding, infrastructure supporting 
crime fighting, including 4 million CCTV cameras, a forthcoming Identity Card, already 
required for non-UK students, and the largest DNA database of any nation. These infrastructures 
have raised concerns and actions related to privacy, human right and civil liberties including: 
1. A politician resigning, in relation to the government’s position, in order to the highlight the 
erosion of civil liberties - only to stand for and win back his seat,. His resignation statement 
noted: “we will have shortly the most intrusive identity card system in the world. A CCTV 
camera for every 14 citizens, a DNA database bigger than any dictatorship has, with 
thousands of innocent children and millions of innocent citizens on it”.   
2. The UK’s Home Affairs Committee releasing results of an inquiry into “A surveillance 
society?” (House of Commons , 2008) 
3. The scientific validity of Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis being challenged in 
relation to the Omagh bombing (NICC49, 2007), prompting a further investigation into the 
validity of the approach. (Home Office, 2008) 
4. A report into the UK Government losing personal details (names, addresses, dates of birth 
and bank accounts) of 25 million citizens blames serious institutional deficiencies. 
Following events of 2001 and 2005, the call for further laws and technologies supporting a 
“fight” against terror and crime was made loudly. Some would suggest the response has become 
disproportionate and overly intrusive, and there are concerns about both legality and scientific 
rigour. Various UK government departments routinely collect personal data about citizens, and 
are supposed to be governed under the DPA 1998; indeed, most try not to lose them. 
Nevertheless, a range of large-scale data collection and population monitoring is underway, with 
the UK able to boast significant infrastructure supporting the fight: 
a) The largest DNA database of any nation state, containing DNA records for over 5% of the 
population 4, 50% larger than the combination of data in all of the remaining EU member 
states and growing by more than half a million a year. (Hope, 2008a)  
b) Over 4 million CCTV cameras monitoring the movements of citizens, and producing 
significant volumes of potential video evidence. 
c) Discussions being held with potential suppliers over the provision of a National Identity card 
scheme, and major contracts being signed by IT companies for biometrics databases and 
registration systems. 
Individually, these developments are significant. If we now consider the integration of these 
initiatives: the Identity Cards Act 2006 provides for a National Identity Register, and registering 
for the card may require individuals to provide “fingerprints, and other biometric information”, 
to be photographed, and more broadly to “provide such information as may be required by the 
Secretary of State”. If DNA were considered within this remit as biometric information, and 
should the photograph be suitable for comparison to captured CCTV data, this Act provides an 
apparently strong integrating capability with other databases. The future capacity for using such 
an integrated database for automated, rather than manual, monitoring becomes significant.  
Projects at this scale, CCTV surveillance, ID cards and DNA databases, may be viewed as based 
on the inference that: Criminals are the minority and anybody could be a criminal, therefore we 
can only prevent and detect crime if we are capable of monitoring everybody: we rule large 
numbers of people out of having committed the crime and focus resources on the remainder. 
Objections to such databases and systems, and to collection of your DNA, imply that you must 
have something to hide: government spokesmen suggest “people who were innocent had nothing 
to fear” (Hope, 2008b).   
One might expect all of these collections to be subject to the provisions of the DPA which 
precedes such systems. The DPA reflects the UK implementation of European Directive 
95/46/EC for protection of personal data, though there have been debates over the degree to 
which these are aligned (OUT-LAW, 2004).  The DPA includes 8 principles of data protection 
covering that data should be accurate, up to date, adequate, relevant, not excessive, fairly and 
lawfully processed in line with rights of data subjects, for specified purposes, secured against 
loss or accidental destruction, not kept longer than necessary, and not transferred to non-EEA 
countries without adequate protection. However, Section IV of the DPA outlines a number of 
exemptions. DPA section 29 (s.29) relates to prevention and detection of crime and collection of 
taxes, giving an exemption from principle 1 that personal data shall be processed fairly and 
lawfully; this seems to imply that unfair and illegal processing is acceptable. Additionally, there 
exists an exemption to s.7 regarding right of subject access. In essence, the person about whom 
the data are stored is unable to use the DPA to find out how these data are used and by whom 
(principle 2), whether it is adequate, relevant or excessive (3), accurate (4), is being kept for 
longer than necessary (5), processed in accordance with their rights (6), and has to assume that it 
is not being transferred out of the EEA (8). In short, there is little by way of accountability 
towards the data subjects themselves such that they may have confidence in this system. This 
becomes particularly relevant given “volunteered” data, as will be discussed later. Furthermore, a 
second exemption relates to the- apparently ambiguous- notion of national security:   
 “Personal data are exempt from any of the provisions of (a) the data protection principles, 
(b) Parts II, III and V, and (c) section 55, if the exemption from that provision is required for 
the purpose of safeguarding national security”.   
Data protection principles which are enforceable, then, would appear to be specific to the context 
of use of the NDNAD. Extending the arguments above would suggest that anybody could be a 
terrorist - then, the entire database is for the purpose of safeguarding national security, and 
protections are largely lifted. In addition, it is evident that “function creep” in one particular law 
that was intended to ensure legitimacy of surveillance (the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000) results in its being used “to conduct surveillance to deal with fly-tipping, littering, dog 
fouling and the sale of alcohol to those aged under 18”5. This, however, is a targeted 
consideration – surveillance directed towards specific individuals; the processing of data in order 
to determine groups of people with similar DNA profiles takes a rather less discriminatory 
approach, and searching through all database records to determine such matches would suggest 
that the entire database becomes exempt during that processing. It is just such a combination of 
function creep, differential exemptions, and an inability for individuals to determine, for 
example, the accuracy of the data held about them, that suggests a difficulty with a statement 
such as “people who were innocent had nothing to fear”.  
Once can hypothesize about ownership of personal data and, especially, biological samples and 
the data that relate them to oneself. Different kinds of value can be ascribed to data of various 
kinds. For Litman (2000) the privacy-as-property model encourages a market in personal data, 
and here the proposal is made that breach of confidence/trust would apply more effectively, with 
tort law being used to “assess the context in which consent [to use the data] was given”. This 
would assume that consent has been given, which we address briefly in section 3. However, 
without right of access to data, since this is a legal exemption, it may prove difficult to make a 
case. More widely, the immediacy of invasion of privacy, and comparative glacial pace and 
disproportionate costs of most legal remedies tends not to discourage a trade in data, and 
organizations deriving profits in such trade may willingly hedge these against likelihood of 
action. For the NDNAD, exemption to the right of subject access implies that we may not even 
know if such data is in the system, suggesting that there can be no challenge over ownership. 
Bergstrom (2000) considered Lockean, utilitarian and contractarian views relating to ownership 
of samples, and particularly of medical samples, though little can be discerned by way of 
conclusion: “we can say that it is very hard indeed to settle political and moral problems of 
ownership in a principled way”. A question explored in this work is: “Should we say that the 
breast cancer gene BRCA 1 belongs to each person who has that gene?”; an analogy could be 
drawn to matching sites on the DNA profile. In absence of identifying information, we may 
make matches amongst samples through common features, but it is in establishing a connection 
to a named individual, or a group of named individuals, that the issue of privacy arises and for 
these systems, identifying people is the dominant purpose. For Bergstom, also, the utilitarian 
view relates to the greater good emergent from use of samples, rather than to the question of 
sample ownership. The utilitarian view from this consideration would suggest quarantine during 
an influenza pandemic, for example, takes precedence over liberty. The extension to this 
consideration would be that individuals may own the samples, but cannot own the knowledge 
derived from the analysis of these samples; here, by extension, you would have access to DNA 
samples, but still no rights over your data.  
We are concerned, principally, with whether the various exemptions from the DPA would imply 
exemptions for software developers from the codes of practice and ethics of their professional 
societies as relate to constructing or maintaining such data and the databases and systems in 
which they are housed and used. In particular, we consider the implications of a generic 
exemption as would exist in the interests of safeguarding national security. This goes further to 
questions about whether these professionals are fully cognizant of the risks of what they are 
doing, and whether they are being honest about risks and providing sufficient protection for 
fundamental human rights and the privacy of others. This is important given doubts about the 
perceived value of ever-more extensive collections of DNA for fighting crimes, the ways in 
which the database is being used and controlled, and how the information contained becomes a 
high-value proposition for private companies and a target for external attacks due to the high-
value of information about health, family relationships, appearance, and associated data related 
to behavior, not just identity. Our intention is to identify the potential conflict for professionals, 
and ask whether such general exemptions are themselves harmful. Expectations on such 
professionals may also be compromised by the move from government-supported forensic 
agency to profit-motivated corporate entity 6 and more widely by the commercial interests of 
large corporations. In general, perhaps we can only ever limit how much we invade privacy, but 
we have to balance this against potentially conflicting legal, professional and ethical 
considerations and the drive towards profitability of such enterprises should not be made to the 
detriment of civil liberties. 
We emphasize that we are broadly in favour of the collection and use of DNA evidence relating 
to crimes, understand its specific value in solving crimes of a certain nature, and believe in the 
scientifically well-grounded approaches to the analysis when used to corroborate other evidence, 
with associated statistics over accuracy of robust testing. However, the role of DNA in crime 
detection is changing, and previous protections over such data seem to be being eroded. We, as 
computing professionals, are, concerned about certain approaches being used to populate the 
database, protections afforded to the data, validity of certain analyses and potential for invasion 
of privacy of ever larger numbers of individuals.  
3. DNA, evidence and analysis 
DNA has a number of interesting features, from its structure as discovered by Crick and Watson, 
to figures regarding its uniqueness. DNA analysis was used initially to relate DNA from a crime 
scene to DNA of one or more suspects, or to rule specific suspects out. Now, DNA is becoming a 
principal weapon with profiles obtained from crime scenes used to derive lists of potential 
suspects, or members of the family (familial DNA) of a potential offender. The standard test for 
DNA, SGM+, reportedly offers a 1 in 1 billion chance that an identical sample of DNA could be 
obtained from a different subject. This is improved over the 1 in 50m chance offered by its 
predecessor SGM test. These estimated probabilities suggest strong accuracy in matching and 
therefore offender identification. The SGM+ approach may be statistically compelling, but 
presently concerns are being raised regarding familial DNA, and the accuracy of so-called Low 
Template analysis techniques such as LCN. There are concerns, also, over increasing reliance on 
DNA evidence: the so-called “CSI effect” where one should “follow the evidence, it never lies” 
(Woodsand & Foggo, 2008). Information regarding probabilities for LCN and familial 
approaches is not readily available, and the understanding of DNA by both scientists and defense 
lawyers, is leading to specific questions over travelling, shedding, contamination and analysis. A 
number of such risks were identified by Gill (2001) in establishing LCN DNA analysis, an 
approach we will discuss later. 
Shedding: Some are more prone to “shed” DNA than others, and various scientifically 
controlled experiments have demonstrated that and this can lead to secondary transfer with DNA 
transferred to an object via another person without their own DNA being placed, depending on 
whether a particular subject is a good or bad “shedder”. If a good shedder shook hands with a 
bad shedder, and the bad shedder subsequently touched an object, the good shedders DNA could 
be transferred – 
 “The full DNA profile of one individual was recovered from an item that they had not 
touched while the profile of the person having contact with that item was not observed” 
(Lowe et al, 2002).   
This type of secondary transfer was previously thought not to impact standard investigations: 
“Our data do not support the conclusion that secondary transfer will compromise DNA typing 
results under typical forensic conditions” (Ladd et al, 1999). Whether this conclusion is 
consistent with LCN and familial DNA analysis is a different question.  
Travelling: DNA goes to places its “owner” has never been, and can remain in the same 
location for at least a few thousand years (Austin et al, 1999). DNA could be planted at crime 
scenes to incriminate others, e.g. by transporting objects such as cigarette ends, cutlery, cups or 
glasses to the scene.   
 “Last year detectives reinvestigating a case of rape got a DNA profile from a strand of hair 
caught in a ring worn by the victim. The DNA identified Mark Minick, who was charged with 
the rape. Yet when the case arrived in court, it fell apart. Minick is white, small and slim – 
while the victim had described her attacker as black, large and tall. She is thought to have 
picked up Minick’s hair by chance from a blanket in the hospital where he had worked”. 
(Woodsand and Foggo, 2008) 
Swabs of saliva may now be taken from buses and used to trace individuals (Lydall, 2007). 
Aside from the unsavoury nature of the incident, we can identify two causes for concern 
regarding contamination and analysis.  
Contamination: A mixture of DNA from different people may be present in a sample, 
possibly before or after a crime has occurred. Contamination can occur through incorrect 
handling, particularly by those with little training in doing so. One police force has estimated a 
6% success rate in obtaining a full profile suitable for matching using LCN (Home Office, 2008) 
due to small sample quantities and impacts of contamination. 
Analysis: If a crime were committed on the bus at some distance, or some time, from 
where the saliva’s owner had departed the bus, the DNA trace may or may not be uniquely 
identifying due to contamination but may implicate one or more owners, and presumption of 
innocence of the latter crime would become difficult to argue. LCN and familial analysis may 
result in a number of false positives. 
4. Data Collection 
The intended purpose of data collection, on such a scale as for the DNA database, is suggested as 
crime detection and, perhaps, prevention. The populating of this DNA database from samples 
collected from those who have come into contact with the police suggests that the UK has over 
5% of its population with criminal tendencies. NDNAD can be further expanded by continued 
selection of specific groups of the population, beginning with those undergoing criminal records 
bureau (CRB) checks for working with children and other groups.  In addition, DNA samples 
can be forcibly taken through supposedly minimally invasive techniques involving removal of a 
hair or a mouth swab, for example. Voluntary inclusion is also possible, though it has 
traditionally been difficult to withdraw permission for your data to be used once voluntarily 
included or to object to its use in genetic research; this may also be a reflection of one of the 
strategic objectives identified in the National DNA database Annual Report 2005-6 of 
“maximizing sampling opportunities” (Home Office, 2007). The current shift in thinking is 
towards an “expectation” that such samples would be destroyed at some undefined future point 
(OUT-LAW, 2008c) and only the convicted should be retained on NDNAD (OUT-LAW, 
2008a). Recent recommendations regarding NDNAD have made little change to what already 
exists, beyond identifying a need for increased communication (Human Genetics Commission, 
2008); much of the debate remains as “divided opinions”. 
There are discrepancies in retention of data and samples: legislation in Scotland differs slightly 
from that covering England and Wales, allowing for data to be removed more easily – though 
there remains a question of how a data subject can know that the data has actually been removed 
and the sample destroyed. This difference leaves “England and Wales… isolated internationally 
as the only countries where DNA of thousands of innocent people can be kept permanently” as 
the recent enrolled law are not applicable for automatic deletion of DNA yet (GeneWatch, 2008). 
Some suggest “the DNA of people convicted or arrested for violent or sex offences should 
remain on the database for life, but that need not be the case for minor offences”7. Some 
commentators would like “to expand the database to cover the whole population and all those 
who visited the UK, even for a weekend”8. Others believe that “the larger the databank ... the 
greater the value of the databank will be in preventing crime and detecting those responsible for 
crime”9. However, GeneWatch have reported that a DNA database containing samples of 
acquitted suspects may have increased the size of the database but has not increased the 
likelihood of solving crimes (GeneWatch, 2008). The number of crime scene samples is 
significant, not necessarily the number of collected DNA profiles. With the exception of Cold 
Case Reviews, many publicised convictions appear to be being obtained because DNA data was 
already available through prior offences rather than serendipitous sampling. 
Some use of DNA samples and data has already been made by genetics researchers. Consent to 
use these samples does not appear to have been sought from, or given by, the data subjects. 
People are fighting for their DNA and rights in courts (OUT-LAW, 2004; OUT-LAW 2007).  
Companies in charge of keeping the samples secure (Forensic Science Service) are fighting to 
retrieve stolen database information and DNA samples (Gallagher, 2007). Some consideration of 
DNA transmission across Europe has been made, though in relatively small numbers due to a 
lack of automation 10. 
5. Data Analysis: Newer techniques for DNA matching 
The standard test for DNA, SGM+, has increased the odds against the sample coming from 
another offender 1 in 1 billion. This accuracy, and international acceptance and validation, 
implies strong suitability for offender identification when matched against samples taken from 
crime scenes. Here, DNA evidence is used to support or refute an existing hypothesis regarding a 
suspect. Newer approaches have emerged along two particular lines: 1) searching for 
characteristics in the DNA samples likely to be shared by family members, therefore providing 
lists of likely suspects; 2) amplification with smaller samples than suited for SGM+. Both 
techniques are controversial, as will be outlined. Other techniques and variations also exist. 
Familial DNA analysis 
DNA evidence was previously used for confirmation of a suspect – now it is being used to drive 
the approach to identifying potential suspects. Familial DNA flags what might be termed the 
“genetically guilty”: those contained in the database whose DNA characteristics may be shared 
by close family members, but the DNA profile of a presumed criminal family member is not 
present. Here, we may draw analogy with diagnosis and prediction in a medical context: “a 
difference between predictive genetic testing in which the patient is tested for genetic 
information that may be indicative of future disease and diagnostic testing in which the patient is 
tested for genetic information that may confirm a diagnosis of an existing disease” (Moor 1997). 
Family members may share DNA characteristics that may be indicative of potential guilt, but a 
full match is needed to “diagnose”. The family members will be contacted, with the entire family 
blanketed by suspicion until all family DNA samples have been “volunteered” and analyzed. 
Recall that voluntarily given samples may be obtained using force, and cannot be easily removed 
from the database, so this could, amongst other methods, expand the DNA database further. A 
familial DNA search may be considered expensive, at “£5,000 for a speculative operation” 
(Smith, 2006) but with privatization of the forensic service providers, such services can act as 
revenue generators. Some successes are claimed using familial DNA analysis, but there are 
various concerns over using familial DNA analysis extensively. These relate to particular ethnic 
groups, with invasion of privacy noted disproportionately for the Hispanic community of 
America (Grimm, 2007). The concern is echoed in the UK also: “Certain groups such as young 
males and ethnic minorities are over-represented on the database, and the Council will be asking 
whether this potential for bias in law enforcement is acceptable”11.     
The DNA database annual report suggests that 7 categories of ethnic appearance are associated 
to the data (and separated by gender); age profile information provides numbers upwards from 
the 15-24 age group, though records are also included for children under 10. Fortunately: “there 
were no records on the NDNAD for persons under 10 years of age where the sample has been 
taken without the consent of a parent or legal guardian” (Home Office, 2007). It would seem a 
short leap to collecting such data at birth and to use this for research into genetic identification of 
potential criminals: “You could argue, the younger the better. Criminologists say some people 
will grow out of crime; others won't. We have to find who are possibly going to be the biggest 
threat to Society” 12. The report on “A surveillance society?” (House of Commons, 2008) 
identifies that “DNA scene-to-scene matches help identify patterns of criminal behaviour that 
may help solve past, existing and future crimes”. Howsoever considered, such data may be 
vulnerable to future misuse, for the racial profiling of suspects for instance, or for future 
restrictions on civil liberties. So, as posited in the title of this paper, the continued collection of 
such data could allow for crimes that haven’t yet been committed to be solved – even predicted – 
and even allow future prosecutions for crimes that haven’t even been invented yet - through 
retrospective or retroactive (ex post facto) laws enacted by less liberal governments, where 
parliamentary supremacy exists (e.g. as in the UK), or with whom these data might be shared. 
Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis 
LCN DNA analysis involves the amplification of smaller samples of DNA than would be used 
with the standard SGM+ test. This introduces risks of misidentification due to contamination. In 
proceedings of R v Hoey, (NICC49, 2007) the use of LCN DNA analysis was explored in 
charges against Sean Hoey relating to a variety of bomb and mortar attacks and the Omagh car 
bomb on 15 August 1998 that killed twenty-nine and injured hundreds. Evidence collection had 
not adequately avoided contamination – future use of LCN analysis could not have been 
expected – and there were other questions over transit of evidence. Concerns raised by the 
defence experts included that “there is no validation other than the assertion by Drs Gill and 
Whitaker that two published journal papers they had written amounted in effect to peer review 
and thereby the necessary validation”. The judge was “not satisfied that the publishing of two 
journal articles describing a process invented by the authors can be regarded without more as 
having "validated" that process for the purpose of its being confidently used for evidential 
purposes”. The LCN approach was criticized for reproducibility: it could be possible to obtain a 
third contradictory result from smaller parts of the same sample, where the first two results might 
agree: “Thus the normal approach used in the United Kingdom had unintentionally been 
demonstrated by its own proponents to be potentially (and in that particular instance actually) 
misleading”. In the Omagh case, also, LCN analysis produced a Nottingham schoolboy as a 
partial match. LCN analysis also suggested that Madeleine McCann had been transported in a 
hire car rented by her parents after her disappearance (Woodsand and Foggo, 2008).  
The Home Office report on the Science of Low Template DNA Analysis (LTDNA) (Home 
Office, 2008) appears to agree that “This process should then be repeated enough times to obtain 
a statistically robust measure of the reproducibility of the system”. The report identifies that 
three different providers of LTDNA analysis employ different methods in analysis, and found 
difficulties obtaining validation data regarding the LCN approach, though they believed that the 
data, “part of which is from a previous publication and some of which appears as an in-house 
study” was able to “represent a validation of LCN DNA analyses”. Mention is made of a need to 
provide information regarding the statistical robustness of matching, and the report identifies 
health warnings that should be applied when results of LTDNA analysis are used in courts:  
“that the nature of the original starting material is unknown; that the time at which the DNA 
was transferred cannot be inferred; and that the opportunity for secondary transfer is 
increased in comparison to standard DNA profiling”.   
6. Data Protection Act and Codes of Ethics. 
Would exemption from the principles of the DPA for NDNAD, in the interests of safeguarding 
national security, also automatically provide an exemption for software developers and other 
computing professionals from the codes of practice and ethics of their professional societies? In 
constructing or maintaining such a database, and safeguarding the data therein, one would 
suggest not. This goes further to questions regarding whether these professionals are properly 
knowledgeable about risks associating to the use of these data, and whether they are providing 
sufficient safeguards for the privacy of others. We can suggest a potential conflict between how 
such professionals ought to act, and current NDNAD practices. We relate the 8 principles of the 
DPA, the ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (ACM, 1992), and the foregoing 
discussion in the table below. We could easily have selected other more or less specific codes, 
including the ACM’s Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice, but 
significantly, this Code identifies: 
Know and respect existing laws pertaining to professional work: obey existing local, state, 
province, national, and international laws unless there is a compelling ethical basis not to do 
so [..] sometimes existing laws and rules may be immoral or inappropriate and, therefore, 
must be challenged. Violation of a law or regulation may be ethical when that law or rule 
has inadequate moral basis or when it conflicts with another law judged to be more 
important. If one decides to violate a law or rule because it is viewed as unethical, or for any 
other reason, one must fully accept responsibility for one's actions and for the consequences. 
Below we introduce further facts and figures and make suggestions regarding handling such data.
ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct Analysis, Facts and Figures Further suggestions
Principle 1:  Fairly and lawfully processed 
1.1- protect fundamental human rights and 
respect the diversity of all cultures; 
minimize negative consequences of 
computing systems 
1.2 - report any signs of system dangers that 
might result in personal or social damage. 
1.4 – take action not to discriminate on the basis 
of race, sex, religion, age, disability, 
national origin, or other such factors 
1.7 - Respect the privacy of others 
2.5 - Give comprehensive and thorough 
evaluations of computer systems and 
their impacts, including analysis of 
possible risks 
Consider LCN DNA analysis and Familial 
DNA analysis.  Estimated 200,300 
individuals who have been acquitted; 
139,463 neither charged nor cautioned 
(Home Office, 2007).  
There are more than a million less than 18 – 44 
under 10- many of them never 
convicted (Home Office, 2007; Hope, 
2008b).  Concerns over impacts on 
specific ethnic groups. 
Do not retain data regarding sex, gender, 
age or ethnicity since matching of 
profiles should be sufficient.  
 
Principle 2: Processed for specified purposes 
1.7 - personal information gathered for a specific 
purpose not be used for other purposes 
without consent of the individual(s) 
3.5 - Articulate and support policies that protect 
the dignity of users and others affected by 
a computing system. 
DNA also used being used for scientific 
(genetic) research: ten agreed requests 
for access to the database to assisting 
the research and development of 
forensic service providers for “R & D 
papers, for future use in cases, not 
specific investigations”, amongst 
others (Home Office, 2007). Data 
subjects not informed and have no 
control over it 
Provide a set of strictly specified and 
defined purposes that relate only to 
crime. 
Offer opt-in for further uses, for ALL 
samples and profiles.   
UK has BioBanks for voluntary provision 
of DNA samples for research 
proposes. 
  
 
Principle 3: Adequate, relevant and not excessive 
1.7 Respect the privacy of others; only the 
necessary amount of personal information 
is collected in a system. 
3.5 - Articulate and support policies that protect 
the dignity of users and others affected by 
a computing system. 
National DNA database Annual Report 2005-6 
refers to “maximizing sampling 
opportunities”.   
Need to retain samples as well as profiles?  
Is such a large scale collection required if only 
0.36% success rate?  
What is the need for ethnic profiles if DNA 
evidence is so robust and accurate? 
As Principle 1. Also, specify when it is 
necessary to keep DNA samples 
since computerized profiles should 
be sufficient for suspect matching.  
No strategies by corporate entities for 
“maximizing sampling 
opportunities”. 
 
Principle 4: Accurate and up to date 
1.7- ensure the accuracy of data, as well as 
protecting it from unauthorized access or 
accidental disclosure 
Questions over accuracy of results in relation 
to LCN DNA analysis and false 
identification. Also 12% duplication 
(Home Office, 2007); over 500,000 
false names (BBC, 2007b); 100,000 
erroneous records (Ballard, 2007) 
Ensure approaches used to derive match 
profiles are technically and 
scientifically validated. Remove 
inaccurate data.  
 
Principle 5: Not kept longer than necessary 
1.7 retention and disposal periods clearly defined 
and enforced 
Kept in perpetuity – especially if sample 
volunteered (see below). 
Specify reasonable times given specific 
provisions.  
Principle 6: Processed in line with rights of data subjects
1.7- allow individuals to review their records and 
correct inaccuracies 
1.8- respect all obligations of confidentiality to 
employers, clients, and users unless 
discharged from such obligations by 
requirements of the law or other 
principles of this Code 
Data removed from database only following 
substantial appeals, potentially to the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
Different law applying to Scotland. 
Consent required for continued retention of 
most current, non-criminal, profiles. 
Further consent needed for any 
research purposes.  
Individuals not charged with crimes should 
be able to have their data removed 
from the database and samples 
destroyed after a specified time, and 
not have to fight for this if in 
England or Wales. 
Principle 7: Secured against loss or accidental destruction 
1.2- avoid harm to others such as undesirable loss 
of information (One way to avoid 
unintentional harm is to carefully 
consider potential impacts on all those 
affected by decisions made during design 
and implementation). 
1.7- ensure the accuracy of data, as well as 
protecting it from unauthorized access or 
accidental disclosure 
Previous FSS employers obtained access to 
DNA information (Gallagher, 2007); 
disc containing 2,000 profiles “lost” 
for a year (Gaedham & Clement, 2008; 
Watt, 2008) 
 
Security provisions as would be expected 
for other data under the DPA, and 
as recommended by the UK’s 
Information Commissioner. More 
robust supervision of third party 
forensics providers and audits of 
activities 
Principle 8: Not transferred to other non-EEA countries without adequate protection 
 No secure framework for sharing within 27 
European countries. 
Specify adequate protections that must exist 
in relation to other data protection 
principles outlined here. 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have discussed some of the issues that arise due to certain kinds of exemptions 
existing in the UK’s Data Protection Act (DPA). We have considered these with respect to the 
world’s largest collection of DNA data, and identified how certain exemptions may cause 
difficulties for individuals. In addition, we considered how various media reports demonstrate 
wider lack of adherence to the 8 principles of DPA. Wider understanding of issues relating to 
DNA, such as travelling, and to the accuracy of the various techniques beyond the widely 
reported gold standard SGM+ test may enhance the nature of the current debate. As noted, we 
are broadly in favour of the collection of DNA evidence relating to crimes, understand its 
specific value in solving crimes of a certain nature, and believe in the scientifically well-
grounded approaches to the analysis when used to corroborate other evidence, with associated 
statistics over accuracy of robust testing. However, with the role of DNA in crime detection 
changing, protection of such data seems to have eroded, and it would be a concern that such 
erosion is apparent for other systems similarly DPA-exempted. We, as computing professionals, 
are concerned generally about protection for data, particularly in large-scale distributed 
computing systems, and consider this particularly important when the data are gathered and 
maintained by governments who impose laws over how such data shall be gathered and 
maintained by others. Further, we would expect that computing professionals would need to 
abide by data protection and privacy principles as enshrined in codes of conduct, tending here to 
imply an exemption to exemptions. Such considerations should be foremost when newer 
technologies are being recommended for uptake, with DPA principle 8 vital when promoting 
Government use of geographically-distributed systems such as the “G-Cloud” (DCMS, 2009). It 
would be an expectation that full adherence to the Data Protection Act would exist from the 
outset for any such data, with specific instances of lack of adherence being documented. This 
would further remove the need for any future legislation formed to plug a supposed gap, which is 
likely to introduce its own potential for exploitation. This suggestion is backed, in part, by the 
report on “A surveillance society”: many of the recommendations echo the 8 principles already 
enshrined in the Data Protection Act - safeguarding personal information; obtaining consent for 
collecting and processing data; hold information only as long as is necessary; designed with a 
focus on security and privacy - suggesting either that exemptions are already rather more widely 
applied, or that these principles have been undermined; it would seem wasteful to create new 
laws because existing ones are not being applied. More generally, development of such 
technologies with significant potential impacts on privacy place an onus on computing 
professionals in terms of actions and understanding of increasingly more complex problems and 
systems. Uses, users, and those impacted by such systems should be well considered, even as far 
as the nature and veracity of evidential support provided by such systems.  In R v Hoey, the 
judge cited Lord Lowry LCJ in R. v Steenson and others [1986], and this comment bears 
consideration here:  
"Justice 'according to law' demands proper evidence. By that we mean not merely evidence 
which might be true and to a considerable extent probably is true, but, as the learned trial 
judge put it, "evidence which is so convincing in truth and manifestly reliable that it reaches 
the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt." 
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